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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(a), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: 
Whether Ameritemps can challenge this Court's jurisdiction despite its failure to 
raise its claimed right of rehabilitation before the Labor Commission, and thereby exhaust 
its administrative remedies, and whether styling its argument as "jurisdictional" relieved 
Ameritemps of its duty to exhaust its administrative remedies as a pre-requisite to asking 
this Court for relief. 
Standard of Review: 
Whether this Court can consider a motion to dismiss that was based on arguments 
not presented to the Labor Commission, is strictly a question of law, and is reviewed 
under a correction of error standard. Respondents cited Housing Authority v. Snyder, 
2002 UT 28 \ 11, 44 P.3d 724, urging a correctness review. Petitioner agrees, and urges 
this Court to dismiss Respondent's claim for precisely the same reasons the Utah 
Supreme Court dismissed Housing Authority's appeal in that case. Housing Authority's 
claim against Snyder was dismissed because it failed to provide a federally required 
grievance procedure, and thereby failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
Consequently, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Housing 
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Authority's contract claims, and the Supreme Court reversed the district court's opinion 
with prejudice. Id. at 730. 
This Court should dismiss Ameritemps' claim under the reasoning of Housing 
Authority. Housing Authority'*s facts are procedurally similar because like Housing 
Authority, Ameritemps seeks to dismiss Mr. Albert's claims because of a claimed right. 
Like Housing Authority, Ameritemps failed to exhaust its administrative remedies before 
asking this Court for relief. Accordingly, this Court should conclude that Ameritemps 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies because it failed to assert its claimed right of 
rehabilitation before the Commission. Consequently, UAPA bars this Court from 
granting Ameritemps' dismissal. Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2). 
Preservation for Review: 
Ameritemps failed to preserve this argument on appeal, because it never presented 
its "right to rehabilitate" argument to the Labor Commission. Nor did Ameritemps appeal 
the facts of its own stipulation that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. Having 
failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, Ameritemps can not now ask this Court to 
dismiss solely because it was "denied the right" to rehabilitate Mr. Albert. 
2. Issue: 
Whether Mr. Albert's permanent total disability was directly caused by alleged 
pre-existing or non-industrial injuries depends first on whether the Commission found 
facts that supported pre-existing or non-industrial injury defenses, and failing that, 
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whether Ameritemps preserved those factual issues on appeal. Because there were no 
factual issues on appeal, then the remaining issue is whether the Commission correctly 
applied the law to the facts, finding that Mr. Albert's last industrial accident with 
Ameritemps directly caused his permanent total disability. 
Standard of Review: 
Whether the Commission correctly determined that Mr. Albert's Ameritemps 
directly caused his permanent total disability is a mixed question of law and fact. Drake 
v. Indus. Comm % 939 P.2d 177, (Utah 1977). In reviewing a legal question that is highly 
fact-dependent, as here, this Court affords great deference to the Commission's 
application of the law to the facts. The Commission applied the odd-lot doctrine to 
determine if Mr. Albert's industrial accident was the "direct cause" of his industrial 
accident. Because the issue on appeal is whether the Commission correctly applied the 
law to the facts of Mr. Albert's case, Drake requires this Court to accord broad discretion 
to the Commission's fact-dependent legal analysis. Id. at 182. 
The "direct cause" of Mr. Albert's disability under the odd-lot doctrine was a fact-
dependent determination, and consequently, the legal issue - whether the Commission 
correctly applied the law to the facts - does not permit this Court to announce "a coherent 
statement of the law," that applies to all "direct cause" or "odd-lot" cases. Id. at 182. At 
the same time, this Court must exercise scrutiny due to the policy of liberally construing 
the Worker's Compensation Act to "resolve any doubt respecting the right of 
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compensation in favor of the injured employee." Id. (quoting State Tax Comm 'n v. Indus. 
Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984) with approval). Accordingly, this Court 
should accord the Commission's application of the odd-lot doctrine to the facts of this 
case great deference, with a view to resolving doubts in favor of compensating Mr. 
Albert. 
Preservation for Review: 
Ameritemps preserved its argument as to whether Mr. Albert's Ameritemps 
industrial accident was the "direct cause" of his permanent total disability. Ameritemps' 
argument is based on facts not found by the Commission, and Ameritemps did not appeal 
any of the factual findings. Consequently, the only issue preserved on appeal is whether 
the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts of Mr. Albert's case. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The pertinent statute is the permanent total disability statute, contained in the 
Workers' Compensation Act: Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Johnny Albert ("Mr. Albert) was seriously injured in four separate industrial 
accidents over the span of seven years. Mr, Albert injured his low back in August, 1990, 
(Quality Plating), and January, 1991 (Barnard & Burk), resulting in 5% whole person 
impairment. On July 28, 1991, Mr. Albert fell from a building and shattered his right 
heel, causing the need for multiple surgeries, and causing a 9% whole person impairment. 
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Over the next five years, Mr. Albert recuperated from his surgeries, and worked with the 
Utah Division of Rehabilitation. Mr. Albert was diagnosed with psychological conditions 
that included depression, learning disorder, written communication disorder, cognitive 
disorder, personality disorder, with borderline intellectual functioning. Mr. Albert was 
later assigned a 30% whole person impairment rating due to psychological conditions, 
with 10% undifferentiated industrial causes, and 20% that pre-dated his industrial 
injuries. Despite the legion of impairments (44% whole person impairment), Mr. Albert 
returned to work with Ameritemps. 
On June 16, 1997, Mr. Albert crushed his left great toe between a steel I beam and 
a pallet jack while working for Ameritemps. The crush injury required four toe surgeries 
including one fusion (failed), and a refusion, which resulted in 4% additional whole 
person impairment. As a direct result of the accident, Mr. Albert had new work 
limitations, and according to his doctor: "[Mr. Albert] cannot walk much except to and 
from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc." Combined with his prior 
impairments, Mr. Albert had sustained 48% whole person impairment, and never returned 
to work. 
At the Labor Commission hearing, the parties stipulated that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled, and the sole remaining issue was which accident, if any, 
directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. 
The ALJ found that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's 
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permanent total disability. 
Ameritemps filed a motion for review, and argued that:l) the Ameritemps accident 
was not the direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability; and 2) the Ameritemps 
accident caused impairment, but not disability. Ameritemps did not appeal the 
Commission's factual finding that Mr. Albert sustained no subsequent non-industrial 
impairment to his toe after his Ameritemps injury. Nor did Ameritemps, much less 
challenge the facts or law concerning its stipulation that Mr. Albert was permanently 
totally disabled, much less that it was denied the right to rehabilitate Mr. Albert. 
The Labor Commission denied Ameritemps' motion for review, and this appeal 
followed. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ameritemps' appeal should be denied because it did not argue that it had the right 
to rehabilitate Mr. Albert in its motion for review. In its motion for review, Ameritemps 
did not challenge its own stipulation that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. 
Nor did it challenge the legal effect of its stipulation - that Mr. Albert could not be 
rehabilitated. Consequently, Ameritemps can not now ask this Court to dismiss for lack 
of subject matter jurisdiction based on its claimed right to rehabilitate Mr. Albert because 
it never challenged the underlying factual or legal issues. Styling the argument as 
"jurisdictional" did not enable Ameritemps to challenge issues not preserved on appeal. 
This Court can not grant Ameritemps' relief because Ameritemps failed to preserve its 
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claimed right of rehabilitation on appeal. 
Ameritemps' appeal should also be denied because its argument that its accident 
did not directly cause Mr. Albert's permanent total disability was contradicted by the 
Commission's factual findings, and Ameritemps did not challenge the facts on appeal. 
But even if it had preserved the issue, the facts were supported by substantial evidence. 
Ameritemps argued on appeal that Mr. Albert was disabled because of pre-existing or 
subsequent non-industrial injuries. But the Commission specifically found that Mr. 
Albert had no subsequent non-industrial impairments. Nor did the Commission find that 
any of Mr. Albert's pre-existing conditions materially worsened after the Ameritemps 
injury. Instead, the Commission found that Mr. Albert worked through multiple industrial 
injuries that caused significant impairment before his Ameritemps injury. It also found 
that Mr. Albert sustained significant impairment as a result of his Ameritemps injury, and 
that Mr. Albert could not return to work after that injury. Ameritemps appeal raised only 
"mixed issues of law and fact." Therefore, the only issue is whether the Commission 
correctly applied the law to the facts. 
The Commission correctly applied the law to the facts when it applied the odd-lot 
doctrine to find Mr. Albert permanently totally disabled as a direct result of the 
Ameritemps accident. The odd-lot doctrine holds employers liable for the entire 
disability that results from a combination of prior disability and the present injury. The 
odd-lot doctrine applies where the statute does not permit apportionment of permanent 
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total disability claims. Neither the former nor the present statute permits apportionment of 
permanent total disability claims. The doctrine is accepted in virtually every jurisdiction, 
and Utah Courts have consistently applied the odd-lot doctrine in permanent total 
disability cases arising under the prior permanent total disability statutes. Therefore, this 
Court should affirm that the Commission correctly applied the law when it applied the 
odd-lot doctrine to Mr. Albert's case. This Court should also apply a deferential review 
of the Commission's decision because of the fact-specific nature of the odd-lot doctrine to 
Mr. Albert's case. This Court should also follow well-settled policy to construe the 
statute with a view to resolving doubts in favor of compensating Mr. Albert. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. Ameritemps Waived Its Right To Rehabilitate Mr. Albert When It Agreed 
That He Was Permanently Totally Disabled. 
This Court should find that Ameritemps waived its right to rehabilitate Mr. Albert 
when it stipulated that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. The facts show that 
Ameritemps failed to preserve this issue on appeal. But if this Court addresses this 
argument on the merits, it should find that Ameritemps waived its right to rehabilitate Mr. 
Albert when it stipulated that he was permanently totally disabled. For these reasons, this 
Court should affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert. 
A. Ameritemps Failed to Preserve This Issue On Appeal. 
This Court should refuse to address this issue because Ameritemps did not 
preserve the issue on appeal. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires parties to 
first exhaust their administrative remedies before this Court can grant relief: "A party may 
seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available . ..." 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2). It is well settled that "issues not raised in proceedings 
before administrative agencies are not subject to judicial review except in exceptional 
circumstances." Brown & Root v. Labor Comm % 947 P.2d 671, 677 (Utah 1997). In 
workers' compensation claims, all issues must be presented to the Commission to satisfy 
the statute's exhaustion requirement. 
The facts show that Ameritemps failed to raise this issue before the Commission. 
First, Ameritemps never made this argument at Mr. Albert's hearing. To the contrary, 
Ameritemps conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. Hearing 
Transcript at 17; (R835 at 17). Second, Ameritemps' motion for review failed to raise 
this issue. The motion only argued that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the 
award; and (2) the accident caused Mr. Albert injury, but did not disable him. 
Ameritemps Motion for Review at unnumbered (2 and 6); (R 592 and 596). 
Consequently, Ameritemps failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, and never gave 
the Commission the opportunity to address this issue. Ameritemps seeks to raise this 
issue for the first time on appeal, and should be denied. 
For these reasons, this Court should decline to address this issue for the first time 
on appeal, and should affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert. 
R. Ameritemps Waived Its Right To Rehabilitate Mr. Albert When It Agreed 
That Mr. Albert Was Permanently and Totally Disabled. 
Ameritemps' argument that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction contradicts 
its own admission that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. The permanent total 
disability statute permits parties to stipulate that an employee is permanently totally 
disabled, and avoid the re-employment activities contemplated under subsection 6: "A 
finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise 
agreed to by the parties . ..." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(6). In this case, the Order 
found that/Ameritemps agreed to Mr. Albert's permanent totally disability, but disputed 
that its accident directly caused the disability. ALJ Order at 5 (R 499). 
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The Order found that each of the respondents admitted that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled, but respondent denied that its respective injury was the 
direct cause of Mr. Albert's disability: 
The respondents conceded that Mr. Albert was permanently 
and totally disabled. However, each of the respondents 
alleged that an injury other than the one respectively defended 
by the individual respondents directly caused Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability. 
ALJ Order at 5 ,^F(R 499). 
By definition, permanently totally disabled employees are unable to be re-
employed under the Act. The Act generally contemplates a two step process1 for 
permanent total disability ("PTD") claims: first, the employee must show that he is 
tentatively permanently totally disabled ("step one"); and second, the burden shifts to the 
employer to either prepare a re-employment plan ("step two"), Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
413 (6)(a)-(c), or pay the claim, Id. at § 413(6)(d)-(e). Employees are tentatively 
permanently totally disabled when they have satisfied their burden of proof (first step), 
and the ALJ must so find. Id. at § 413(6)(a). The tentative finding of permanent total 
disability is subject to the employer's right to re-employ the injured worker, but 
employers are not required to file re-employment plans. Id. at § 413(6)(d). In other 
1
 For a good discussion of re-employment plans in permanent total disability 
cases, see Thomas v. Color Country Management, 84 P.3d 1201, 1207-8 (Utah 2004). 
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words, employees who meet their burden of proof under step one are permanently totally 
disabled unless the employer successfully re-employs the injured worker. 
In this case, the Order found that respondents stipulated that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled ("step two"); not "tentatively" permanently totally disabled 
("step one"). ALJ Order at 5 (R 499). By admitting that Mr. Albert was permanently 
totally disabled, as opposed to "tentatively" permanently totally disabled, all of 
respondents acknowledged that Mr. Albert could not be re-employed. Having admitted 
that Mr. Albert could not be re-employed, Ameritemps can not now complain that the 
ALJ entered a final order of permanent total disability. Ameritemps waived its right to 
re-employ Mr. Albert under subsection 6 when it agreed that Mr. Albert was permanently 
totally disabled. 
Ameritemps can not avoid challenging the underlying facts on appeal by calling its 
argument "jurisdictional." Brief at 13. The final order of permanent total disability was 
based on Ameritemps' agreement that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled. 
Ameritemps can not simply ignore its own complicity: it stipulated that Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled. Ameritemps had to challenge the fact of its own stipulation 
as a pre-requisite to its "jurisdictional" challenge. 
Because the Commission found that Ameritemps stipulated to Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability, the factual finding is must be upheld unless Ameritemps 
demonstrated that the finding was clearly erroneous. Empirical facts of the case are 
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reviewed for clear error. Drake v. Indus. Comm % 939 P.2d 177,181(Utah 1997). 
Whether Ameritemps stipulated that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled was an 
empirical fact. Ameritemps has not challenged that finding on appeal. Accordingly, its 
brief did not dispute its own stipulation. Rather, the brief simply ignored this fact, 
steadfastly arguing that it had the right to attempt to re-employ Mr. Albert. Brief at 13. 
Ameritemps has failed to shoulder its burden in challenging the Commission's facts, 
because it has not even marshaled the evidence - let alone demonstrated any "clear error" 
contained in the Order - and must be denied. Consequently, this Court must accept 
Ameritemps' stipulation as fact, and deny Ameritemps' appeal. 
* * * 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that Ameritemps failed to preserve 
this issue for appeal because it did not raise its claim to re-employ Mr. Albert before the 
Commission. Even if this Court reaches the merits, however, this Court should find that 
Ameritemps' admission that Mr. Albert was permanently totally disabled, and not 
tentatively permanently totally disabled, was a factual admission that Mr. Albert could not 
be re-employed under the Act. Ameritemps did not appeal the fact of its stipulation, and 
therefore can not challenge it on appeal. Even if it had preserved this issue, this Court 
should affirm because the finding was supported by substantial evidence. Ameritemps 
has not demonstrated that the finding was clearly erroneous. Consequently, Ameritemps 
waived its right to re-employment under subsection 6 of the permanent total disability 
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statute. For these reasons, this Court should deny Ameritemps' appeal, and affirm the 
Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert. 
II. The Commission's Conclusion That Mr. Albert Was Permanently and Totally 
Disabled From His Ameritemps Injury Was Supported By Substantial 
Evidence, And Was Consistent With Utah Law. 
This Court should conclude that the Commission's award of benefits was 
supported by substantial evidence. This section demonstrates that Ameritemps' argument 
was based on facts not found by the Commission. Having failed to appeal the findings of 
fact, Ameritemps' appeal must fail. This section also shows that the Commission 
correctly applied the law to the facts of Mr. Albert's case when it relied on the odd lot 
doctrine in awarding Mr. Albert's permanent total disability benefits. 
A. This Court Should Deny Ameritemps' Appeal Because It Was Based On 
Facts Not Found By the Commission, And Ameritemps Did Not Appeal 
The Commission's Findings of Fact. 
Ameritemps' arguments were not supported by the Commission's findings of fact, 
and Ameritemps did not appeal the Commission's factual findings, therefore 
Ameritemps' appeal should be denied. Ameritemps argued that its injury was not the 
direct cause of Mr. Albert's permanent total disability, and that instead, Mr. Albert was 
permanently totally disabled by his low back injuries, or alleged subsequent non-
industrial injuries to his left great toe. Brief at 16 and 19. But the Commission's factual 
findings undercut Ameritemps' legal argument. 
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1. Ameritemps' Argument that Mr. Albert Was Disabled Because of His 
Low Back Injuries Contradict The Facts, Which Show That Mr. 
Albert Sustained No Additional Low Back Impairment After His 
1991 Industrial Accident, And Mr. Albert Continued To Work Years 
After He Injured His Low Back. 
Ameritemps appeal should be denied because the facts show Mr. Albert sustained 
no additional low back impairment after his 1991 injury with Barnard & Burk. 
Ameritemps argued that Mr. Albert's low back injury was the direct cause of his 
disability. Brief at 16. The Commission found that Mr. Albert sustained a 2 Vi % whole 
person impairment from his January 21, 1991 industrial accident with Barnard & Burk. 
ALJ Order at 12 (R 506). But there were no findings that Mr. Albert's low back injury 
became further impaired after his last low back injury in 1991. Nor did his back injury 
prevent him from working at subsequent positions with American Asbestos and 
Ameritemps; Mr. Albert continued working until his 1996 Ameritemps injury. ALJ Order 
at 21 (R 515). The Commission's finding that the Ameritemps injury directly caused Mr. 
Albert's permanent total disability was supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
For these reasons, this Court should deny Ameritemps' appeal, and affirm the 
Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert. 
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2. The Facts Contradicted Ameritemps' Argument That Mr. Albert Was 
Disabled From Subsequent Non-Industrial Injuries. 
The facts show that Mr. Albert was disabled as a direct result of his Ameritemps 
injury. Ameritemps argued that the Commission should have found Mr. Albert disabled 
by other subsequent non-industrial impairments. Brief at 10.2 These subsequent 
impairments, so the Brief argued, would conflict with the Commission's finding that 
Ameritemps accident directly caused Mr. Albert's permanent total disability. Id. But the 
Brief conceded that the Commission did not make the factual findings that supported its 
defense. Id.3 To the contrary, the Commission found no subsequent non-industrial 
injuries to Mr. Albert's great toe: 
[N]o medical evidence existed that demonstrated a causal 
connection between the subsequent incidents referred to by 
Ameritemps and a significant, or ratable, impairment to Mr. 
Albert's left foot other than that caused by his June 16, 1997 
industrial accident. 
ALJ Order at 16 n. 11. The Commission specifically found that Mr. Albert had suffered no 
subsequent non-industrial impairment to his left great toe. Ameritemps' brief admitted as much. 
Brief at 10. Ameritemps had to appeal and reverse these facts for its argument to succeed, but 
did not. 
2
 "Specifically, RESPONDENTS (sic) contend PETITIONER (sic) became 
permanently and totally disabled as a result of his pre-existing back condition and as a result of 
his subsequent non-industrial left great toe injury." Brief at 10. 
3
 "[N]either the ALJ nor the Appeals Board made a finding of fact with respect to 
PETITIONER'S (sic) back pain and subsequent left toe injury ...." Brief at 10. 
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Ameritemps' appeal is based on facts that contradicted the Commission's findings. This 
Court would have to reverse the factual findings to grant Ameritemps' appeal because it was 
based on a finding that contradicted the Commission's findings. This Court can not grant 
Ameritemps' relief, however, because Ameritemps did not appeal the relevant factual findings in 
this case. Instead, Ameritemps conceded that it had appealed a "mixed question of law and fact," 
and not the Commission's factual findings. Brief at 4. Ameritemps' appeal can not succeed 
because it is based on facts not found by the Commission and not raised on appeal. 
3. Ameritemps Did Not Appeal The Commission's Finding that Mr. Albert 
Did Not Suffer Additional Non-Industrial Impairment After the 
Ameritemps Accident. 
Ameritemps' appeal must fail because it was premised on facts not found by the 
Commission and not challenged on appeal. Ameritemps' argument contained two subpoints: (1) 
Additional Facts That Preclude an Award of Permanent Total Disability; and (2) The Labor 
Commission Misapplied the Law to the Facts. Point 1 recited portions of the record, and argued 
that those were "facts," and that those "facts" contradicted the Commission's conclusion that Mr. 
Albert's industrial accident with Ameritemps was the direct cause of his disability. Brief at 14-
21.4 
But the Commission did not make any findings of subsequent non-industrial impairment. 
To the contrary, the ALJ specifically found that Ameritemps failed to prove that Mr. Albert 
suffered subsequent non-industrial impairments. ALJ Order at 16 n. 11. Ameritemps never cited 
to this finding in its brief, and has not directly challenged the finding on appeal. Apart from 
The section is entitled "Additional Facts That Preclude an Award of Permanent 
Total Disability." Brief at 14. 
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preserving the issue on appeal, Ameritemps also had the duty to marshal the evidence to 
demonstrate that the finding was clear error. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 116 P.2d 63 
(Utah App. 1989). Under Grace Drilling, this Court will uphold the findings where they were 
supported by substantial evidence when reviewing the record as a whole. Id. at 68. The party 
challenging the facts must marshal all of the evidence. Id. This Court recently rejected a party's 
appeal where the party "failed to completely satisfy his obligation to marshal the evidence by 
persistently arguing [his] own position without regard for the evidence supporting the [ALJ's] 
findings." McLaws v. Kazamini, 2004 UT App 250 (citations omitted). Similarly, Ameritemps' 
brief recited unsupported statements Mr. Albert made in his deposition and at trial. As shown 
above, the ALJ found these statements insufficient to warrant a finding that Mr. Albert had 
sustained a new injury, in the absence of corroborating specific medical documentation of 
disability. ALJ Order at 16 n. 11 (R 510). This Court can not grant Ameritemps appeal because 
it was based on facts not found by the Commission, and not preserved on appeal. 
* * * 
Ameritemps has prevented this Court from granting the relief it seeks by failing to 
preserve the factual issues for appeal, and by failing to marshal the evidence in support of its 
argument. Therefore, this Court should affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Mr. 
Albert. But even if Ameritemps had preserved the issue and marshaled the evidence, this Court 
should also affirm the Commission's award because its findings were supported by substantial 
evidence. 
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4. The Commission's Findings As To Mr. Albert's Left Toe Injuries Were 
Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
This Court should affirm the Commission's findings as to Mr. Albert's June 16, 1997 
Ameritemps injury and its natural sequellae, because they were supported by substantial 
evidence. The Order found that the facts of Mr. Albert's Ameritemps injury were undisputed, 
and that Mr. Albert had crushed his left great toe between a steel I-beam and a pallet jack. The 
Order found that contemporaneous x-rays showed a "significantly angulated fracture of the first 
proximal phalanx with probable intra-articular extension." ALJ Order at 15; (R 509). Mr. Albert 
had his first left toe surgery on June 30, 1997; his second on November 14, 1997; his third (first 
fusion) on March 11, 1998; and, his fourth (re-do fusion) on July 31, 1998. Id. The Order found 
that Mr. Albert had sustained a 4% whole person impairment as a result of his Ameritemps 
injury. Id. at 16; (R 510). 
The facts show that the Ameritemps injury significantly limited Mr. Albert's ability to 
walk and stand. As set forth in the facts, Mr. Albert previously sustained a 9% whole person 
impairment for his July 28, 1991 right foot injury with American Asbestos. On November 30, 
1993, Dr. Howe stated that Mr. Albert's right foot injury "[p]reclu[ded] [him] from heavy lifting, 
climbing ladders, working at heights and from frequent walking, squatting, kneeling, and stair 
climbing." ALJ Order at 18; (R 512). The Order observed that "after a lengthy convalescence 
Mr. Albert sallied forth again into the work force at Ameritemps," and that after the Ameritemps 
injury, Dr. Howe restricted Mr. Albert to "a light duty job, basically a sit-down job. He cannot 
walk much except to and from work, should not be doing any carrying, lifting, etc." Id. In other 
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words, the facts show that the Ameritemps injury caused Mr. Albert to have little or no use of his 
feet. 
The Order's finding that Mr. Albert had sustained an "impairment or combination of 
impairments" from his Ameritemps injury was supported by substantial evidence, but no 
evidence that Mr. Albert sustained subsequent non-industrial injuries to his left great toe. 
Consequently, Ameritemps' argument is not supported by the facts. This Court should deny 
Ameritemps' appeal, and affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert. 
5. The Commission's Findings As To The Direct Cause of Mr. Albert ys 
Permanent Total Disability Were Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
This Court should conclude that the Commission finding as to the direct cause of Mr. 
Albert's permanent total disability were supported by substantial evidence. The evidence 
showed that before the Ameritemps accident, Mr. Albert was able to work despite significant 
pre-existing injuries resulting in loss of function in his low back, left foot, and psychological 
condition, totaling 44% whole person impairment: 
Mr. Albert's industrial accident with American Asbestos on July 
28, 1991 resulted in a 9% whole person impairment as a result of 
injuries to his right foot caused by the accident. Mr. Albert also 
suffered from serious psychological problems that caused him 
considerable learning difficulty in learning new tasks or performing 
jobs that requred any mental acuity. Mr. Albert's psychological 
impairment, 20% preexisted his industrial accidents, and 10% 
derived undifferentiated from his industrial injuries. Mr. Albert's 
collective physical and psychological problems left him 48% 
impaired as to the whole person. 
Mr. Albert with all of his physical and psychological problems did 
in fact return to work with Ameritemps until his final industrial 
accident on June 16, 1997. However, after Mr. Albert fractured his 
left great toe on June 16, 1997 followed by four consequent 
surgeries, Mr. Albert did not return to work. Mr. Albert's 
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industrial accident with Ameritemps on June 16, 1997 resulted in a 
4% whole person impairment as a result of injuries to his left foot 
caused by the accident. 
ALJ Order at 29 (R 523). The ALJ found it significant that Mr. Albert had succeeded in 
repeatedly returning to the workforce despite his significant impairments. Id. Due to the 
Ameritemps injury, Mr. Albert endured four toe surgeries including two fusions, constant pain, 
and joint ankylosis that resulted in a 4% whole person impairment. Id. The facts supported the 
Commission's conclusion that the Ameritemps accident was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's 
permanent total disability. 
R The Commission's Determination That Mr. Albert Was Permanently Totally 
Disabled Was Well Reasoned And Consistent With Utah Law. 
1. The Odd Lot Doctrine Applied To Mr. Albert's Case. 
The Commission also correctly determined the ultimate legal issue of disability when it 
applied the odd lot doctrine to Mr. Albert's case. The Order first reasoned that in the absence of 
statutes permitting apportionment, employers are subject to the odd lot doctrine. The doctrine 
generally holds employers liable for the entire disability resulting from a combination of the prior 
disability and the present injury. ALJ Order at 29 (R 523) (quoting LARSON'S WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION LAW § 90.01 (2002)). This is known as the "odd lot doctrine." Under the odd 
lot doctrine, the Commission may find permanent total disability when a relatively small 
percentage of impairment combines with other factors unable to obtain suitable employment. 
Hoskins v. Indus. Comm % 918 P.2d 150, 154 (Utah App. 1996). In Mr. Albert's case, the ALJ 
applied the doctrine when he concluded that Mr. Albert's last injury to his left great toe 
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combined with other impairments to render him permanently totally disabled as a direct result of 
his Ameritemps injury. 
This Court should specifically conclude that the odd lot doctrine applied to Mr. Albert's 
case. Ameritemps argued that the Commission misapplied the law, Brief at 21, but most 
jurisdictions apply the odd lot doctrine where the statute does not permit apportionment. 
LARSON'S at § 83.01.5 Neither the former or current Utah statutes permit apportionment of 
permanent total disability claims. Accordingly, Utah Courts regularly applied the odd lot 
doctrine in permanent total disability cases arising under the former statute. See e^g., Peck v. 
EIMCO, Process Equip. Co., 728 P.2d 572 (Utah 1987); Norton v. Indus. Comm 7i, 728 P.2d 
1025 (Utah 1986); Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Mgmt, 725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986); 
Marshall v. Indus. Comm }n., 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). In this case, the Commission applied 
the odd lot doctrine under the present statute to find that Mr. Albert was permanently totally 
disabled as a result of his Ameritemps injury. 
2, The Commission Correctly Applied The Odd Lot Doctrine To Mr. Albert's 
Case When It Awarded Him Permanent Total Disability Benefits. 
This Court should affirm the Commission's award of benefits to Mr. Albert because it 
correctly applied the odd lot doctrine to Mr. Albert's facts. This Court applied the odd lot 
doctrine in a case with similar facts. In Smith v, MityLite, 939 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1997), this 
Court held that an employee's last injury contributed to his inability to work, and directly caused 
his disability under the odd lot doctrine. In that case, the employee suffered from depression, 
5
 The treatise states that, "Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in virtually 
every jurisdiction, total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-
known branch of the labor market." Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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somatoform pain disorder, opiate dependency, and personality disorder. Id. at 690. The 
employee had nonetheless continued to work through these impairments. The Commission had 
errantly denied the claim because the low back injury had not "wholly caused" the employee's 
disability. Id. at 691. This Court reasoned that "such a standard for causation was simply too 
high." Instead, this Court found that "an industrial accident caused a portion of Smith's physical 
impairment; that he cannot perform his former job; and that he is currently disabled." Id, 
Therefore, the Commission should have found that Mr. Smith was disabled as a result of the last 
industrial accident. 
Similarly, the Commission applied the odd lot doctrine to Mr. Albert's facts. Like the 
former statute, the present permanent total disability statute does not permit apportionment of 
permanent total disability claims. Like the MityLite case, Mr. Albert suffered from multiple 
impairments before his 1996 accident with Ameritemps: Mr. Albert sustained 2 lA % whole 
person impairment ("wpi") from his 1990 low back injury at Quality Plating; 2 Vi % wpi from his 
1991 low back injury with Barnard & Burke; 9% wpi from his 1991 right foot injury at American 
Asbestos; 30% wpi from psychological or emotional impairments, of which 10% was 
undifferentiated industrial. ALJ Order at 28-9; (R 522-3). Like the MityLite case, Mr. Albert 
could no longer perform his job after the Ameritemps injury. The Order reasoned that: 
[Djespite the legion of medical and psychological impairments . . . 
Mr. Albert. . . remained able to work until the injury he sustained 
on June 16, 1997 with Ameritemps. The fractured great toe on 
June 16, 1997, with the subsequent four surgeries and 4% whole 
person impairment, proved to be the proverbial straw that broke the 
camel's back. Mr. Albert never returned to work after the June 16, 
1997 industrial accident, and thereafter remained permanently 
totally disabled. Hence, Mr. Albert's industrial accident of June 
16, 1997 directly caused his permanent total disability. 
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Id. at 30 (R 524). Mr. Albert's facts showed that despite significant pre-existing impairment, he 
continued to work until the Ameritemps injury. The Commission correctly applied the odd lot 
doctrine to Mr. Albert's facts when it concluded that the Ameritemps injury combined with his 
other impairments to render him permanently totally disabled, and directly caused his disability. 
3. Under A Deferential Standard of Review, This Court Should Uphold The 
Commission's Application Of The Law To The Facts. 
This Court should uphold the Commission's award of benefits under a deferential 
standard of review. As discussed supra, the Drake case requires this Court to apply a deferential 
standard of review to the Commission's application of the law to the facts, because the odd-lot 
doctrine is a highly fact-dependent analysis. Determining the direct cause of applicants' 
permanent total disability claims depends largely on the specific facts of Mr. Albert's case. The 
Commission's application of the odd-lot doctrine to Mr. Albert's case should be given great 
deference, because this Court can not hope to fashion a statement of law that can adequately 
anticipate all of the possible facts that may arise in each particular case. Accord, Drake, 939 
P2.d at 182. Moreover, affirming the award is consistent with this Court's policy of construing 
the Act to resolve doubts in favor of compensating injured workers. Id. 
In summary, the Commission correctly applied the odd lot doctrine to apply the current 
statutory requirement that the industrial accident be the "direct cause" of the employee's 
permanent total disability. Mr. Albert's case presents an opportunity for this Court to confirm 
that the odd lot doctrine applies to cases arising under the current statute. Under Drake, this 
Court should accord great deference to the Commission's application of the law to the facts, 
because the odd-lot doctrine is a fact-dependent determination. This Court should hold that the 
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Commission correctly applied the law to the facts, and reject Ameritemps argument that it 
misapplied the law. For these reasons, this Court should deny Ameritemps' appeal, and affirm 
the Commission's award of permanent total disability benefits to Mr. Albert. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny Ameritemps' appeal and affirm the Commission's award of 
benefits to Mr. Albert. This Court should affirm that Ameritemps failed to preserve the issue on 
appeal, but on the merits, waived its right to re-employ Mr. Albert when it conceded that he was 
permanently totally disabled. This Court should also affirm that the Commission's determination 
that the Ameritemps injury was the direct cause of Mr. Albert's disability because it was 
supported by substantial evidence, and because Ameritemps' argument was based on facts not 
found by the Commission, nor preserved for consideration on appeal. For these reasons, this 
Court should deny Ameritemps' appeal, and affirm the Commission's award of permanent total 
disability benefits to Mr. Albert. 
DATED this j£_ day of May, 2005. 
KING, BURKE & SCHAAP, P.C. 
Richard R. Burke 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Johnny Albert 
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